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Systems of sociological refraction 
Phil Hutchinson 
Manchester Metropolitan University 
Abstract 
Throughout his career, Wes Sharrock has, following in the footsteps of Ludwig Witt-
genstein, Peter Winch and Harold Garfinkel, sought to argue against accounts of 
the identity of an action which are the products of a social theory, a specific meth-
odology or what Garfinkel termed formal analysis. In contrast, much of contempo-
rary social science and social theory is grounded in a belief that ordinary or compe-
tent members of societies are unreliable authorities on the identity of their own and 
others’ actions because they are subject to systems of sociological refraction. The 
idea being that ordinary members of society are systematically misled as to the iden-
tity of their actions and those of their peers because they—or their perceptions of 
actions—are subject to the refractive properties of (for example) ideology, or folk 
theories of action, and so on. In this paper, I subject to analysis this core commit-
ment of much social science and social theory. 
SYSTEMS OF SOCIOLOGICAL REFRACTION 
The implication of Winch’s contribution to the philosophy of social science was 
relativism. Winch followed Wittgenstein with the notion that reality is structured 
by language, a position that entailed relativism since linguistic rule systems were 
seen as specific to concrete forms of life. As with Gadamer, his conception of social 
science was rooted in a conservative view of the interpretive capacity of social sci-
ence, which was for ever context bound. (Delanty 1997: 55) 
I shall be travelling in what follows a somewhat winding road, and so here is my 
central thesis. If there is no truth, there is no injustice. Stated less simplistically, if 
truth is wholly relativized or internalized to particular discourses or language games 
or social practices, there is no injustice. The victims and protesters of any putative 
injustice are deprived of their last and often best weapon, that of telling what really 
happened. They can only tell their story, which is something else. Morally and po-
litically, therefore, anything goes. (Geras 1995: 110) 
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INTRODUCTION 
Spanning a fifty year career, Wes Sharrock has, following and building upon the 
work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Peter Winch and Harold Garfinkel, sought to argue 
against the widespread assumption that social studies requires special methods of 
analysis or theories of society. While the formal analyses conducted by many 
working in the social sciences assume two worlds of action, where on the one hand 
we have lay understandings of the social world and on the other hand we have the 
real world as disclosed to us by social theory or a specific methodology, Wes Shar-
rock, along with various co-authors, has sought to remind us that if we are to talk 
of the social world we must begin by correctly identifying the actions that consti-
tute that world. Doing this is not a critical endeavour but a matter of correctly 
discerning what it is people are doing, and describing this in a away which resists 
the temptation to introduce, in and through the description, concepts unavailable 
to the participants. In doing so Wes has drawn upon Garfinkel on the endogenous 
co-production of order and on post-Wittgensteinian considerations regarding the 
radical contextualist nature of meaning, where the meaning of an act, just as the 
meaning of language, is argued to be a radically contextual phenomenon. 
Such considerations elicit some push-back from those who are committed to 
the two-world view of action. In this paper, I seek to explore the two-world view 
in more detail so as to understand more clearly what motivates allegiance to it. 
For some, allegiance seems to be based in a commitment to the thought that sci-
ence deals with objective truths, and theory and method are what bring us access 
to such truths. This is then bolstered by concerns such as those expressed by Geras 
and Delanty (quoted above). Such concerns focus in on worry about moral judge-
ment. We might state this as something like the following: If we forgo a claim to 
realism and objectivity about the identity of action, then we surrender appeals to 
justice. For, in order that we can say of an act that it is either just or unjust, right 
or wrong, the identity of the action must not be relative to a culture, a language-
game or a social order: it must be possible to establish the true identity of any 
particular action and that identity must not be relative to the context, perceiver, 
culture, ideology and so on. The thought is that non-cognitivism regarding the 
identity of an action leads to the possibility of a plurality of equally-valid identity 
claims for any piece of behaviour. If pluralism holds in questions as to the identity 
of an action then justice, the thought has it, is unattainable. 
For, consider cases such as the Rodney King (police brutality) trials of the early 
1990s, or the many more recent cases where video testimony of actions is the locus 
of moral, political and legal disagreement (See e.g. Watson 2018). In these cases, 
moral judgement (and legal judgement also) rested on the identity of the actions 
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in question. In these cases, we might say it boiled down to the question: ‘what 
were those policemen doing?’1 
Following Geras, we might then say that it really is not enough to say that the 
police had their story while Rodney King and the viewers of the video tape of the 
beating had theirs. It is not enough because adjudication as to the moral status of 
the actions involving the four policemen and King becomes impossible if we hold 
that it is true that the police were effecting a pre-emptive strike against a man 
whom their training had showed them was about to become very dangerous, while 
also being true that they were involved in a brutal, unprovoked racially motivated 
beating. 
Now, taken as stated here, one might find little about which to object in the 
complaint expressed by Delanty and Geras. However, I want to argue that such 
stance would be mistaken. Geras is wrong, but assumes he is right because he 
assumes the two-world view is the only way we can resist a slide into identity 
pluralism. The point is that the identity of an action being a contextual affair does 
not entail a plurality of equally valid competing accounts of the same action, yet 
this is what the concerns of those such as Geras assume. 
The thoughts expressed by Delanty and Geras invoke something along the fol-
lowing lines: the sociologist or social theorist must explain what people are really 
doing as opposed to what they are apparently doing. The task for the social scien-
tist or social theorist is to expose the apparent actions and disclose real actions. 
For, like the refractive properties of water give life to the bent appearance of the 
submerged stick (which is really straight), what gives life to the mistaking of the 
action as something other than it really is, are the refractive properties of [choose 
one of the following]: 
• ideologies; or, 
• folk theories of action (or society, or human nature, and so on); or, 
• the trace of logically possible alternative identities of any particular ac-
tion; or, 
• the intensional renderings or dressing-up of the physical properties of 
behaviour. 
 
1 In March 1991, four Los Angeles police officers pulled over a car (ostensibly) for a speeding offence. 
The driver, Rodney King, was asked to step out of the car, and on doing so was subjected to a severe 
beating with batons by the four police officers. A member of the public filmed the beating and this 
footage was central to the two subsequent trials of the police officers involved. The first (California 
state) trial acquitted all four police officers of criminal ‘excessive force’ charges, a judgement which 
sparked the 1992 Los Angeles riots. The subsequent civil trial in a Federal court found two of the 
police officers guilty of violating King’s civil rights. Both trials centred on the question as to the 
correct interpretation of their actions as viewed in the video footage: Were they defending themselves 
from a dangerous man; effecting a pre-emptive strike against a man whom their training showed 
them was about to become very dangerous; or were they involved in a brutal, unprovoked racially 
motivated beating. 
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The argument from moral judgement, expressed by Geras, might, therefore, be 
seen to form a pair with the two-worlds theory of action, where the requirements 
of moral judgement invoke an account of the identity of action which differenti-
ates between appearance (apparent action) and reality (action identified via social 
theory, social scientific method or formal analysis). The sociologist’s or social the-
orist’s task, therefore, is to make manifest the cause of the sociological refraction 
and thus uncover what people are really doing, where hitherto we had been po-
tentially misled by the refracted appearances. 
REFRACTING ACTION: SYSTEMATICALLY 
AND SIMPLY MISTAKEN PERCEPTIONS OF ACTION 
People can do things and be simply mistaken about or unaware of the identity 
of that which they are doing; how they see their own actions and those of their 
peers is refracted through ‘X’—and here you can insert in the place of ‘X’ your 
favourite model of sociological refraction, which explains the refraction and 
shows how that refraction is systematic.  
Consider what we’ve just said: When you do something, what it is you are 
doing might be something that you are mistaken about, should you be asked for 
and offer an answer to the question, ‘what are you doing?’ 
Try to think about how one might be misled, mistaken or simply unaware of 
what it is we or others are really doing. Try to think about it, free of thoughts 
about philosophy, methodology, theory, social science and the like. It’s not too 
difficult to grasp. Many of us are familiar with the experience of having undergone 
a shift in our values, which subsequently issue in a shift in our reading of our prior 
actions and this would seem to imply that we can be wrong about what we iden-
tified ourselves as doing, when we look back on what we did.  
Consider an example which will be familiar to those who have seen a famous 
scene from the fourth film in the original (Blake Edwards-Peter Sellers) Pink Pan-
ther series. For those unfamiliar with this somewhat silly series of films made in 
the 1960s and 1970s, they centred on a hapless clown of a police inspector: In-
spector Clouseau of the Sûreté, played with a deliberately daft comedy French 
accent by the English comedy actor and former Goon Peter Sellers. The scene that 
serves as our example here is from the film The Pink Panther Strikes Back. 
Inspector Clouseau enters the lobby of an alpine hotel and immediately after 
checking in—undercover, of course—he observes a dog, laying down on the lobby 
floor. Intending to greet the dog with a pat but being wary of a strange dog, 
Clouseau asks the desk attendant ‘Monsieur, does your dog bite?’ and in response 
the attendant says, ‘no Monsieur, my dog does not bite.’ Clouseau then proceeds 
to pat the dog which in turn proceeds to viciously bite his hand. After struggling 
to free himself from the dog’s grip, Clouseau, in a somewhat pained and reproach-
ful manner, says to the attendant, ‘Monsieur, I thought you said your dog did not 
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bite’, to which the attendant responds implacably, ‘I did, Monsieur; that is not my 
dog’. 
Here, Clouseau took himself to be patting the attendant’s non-biting dog. Only 
later, on having his hand bitten and his second question answered by the attendant, 
Clouseau realizes that he was in fact doing something else: patting a strange biting 
dog. The joke works (if it does for you), because we, the viewer, also take Clouseau 
to be patting the attendant’s dog, until we, at the same time as Clouseau, are in-
formed of, and thus realise, the truth. 
This is a case of a shift in our identification of Clouseau’s action and Clouseau’s 
own identification of his action. The shift is from (something like) ‘Clouseau pats 
attendant’s non-biting dog’ to ‘Clouseau pats strange biting dog’. One might be 
tempted to say the difference here does not amount to something which impacts 
significantly upon our discussion about an action’s identity. For, one might argue, 
we could simply say ‘Clouseau pats a dog’. This answer fails. For in moving to 
simply ‘Clouseau pats a dog’ we are doing one of two things: we are either: 
1. moving to a level of abstraction whereby we fail to adequately specify a 
particular action, but rather denote a class of actions, which contains both 
the act-tokens or specific acts ‘Clouseau pats attendant’s non-biting dog’ 
and ‘Clouseau pats strange biting dog’; or 
2. describing one of the act-tokens, one of the specific acts, in a way which 
fatally under-determines that action to which we are intending to refer. Of 
course, context generally fills in the ‘gaps’ (completes the determination), 
so to speak. We don’t always need to completely—linguistically or seman-
tically, as it were—specify the act-token in a manner that makes no appeal 
to context or occasion of utterance. But in this case, given the purpose, 
saying ‘Clouseau pats a dog’ is misleading.  
This example is, therefore, a case of a shift from the action’s apparent identity 
to its true identity. Is it an example of the sort of thing our social scientists and 
social theorists have in mind when they invoke the apparent / real dictum in crit-
icising people such as Garfinkel, Wittgenstein and Winch? Well, not quite. What 
we have here is a simple mistake: Clouseau mistakenly took the attendant to be 
referring to the same dog as was he. Similarly, we the viewer also assumed the 
attendant to be referring to the dog to which Clouseau refers. A simple mistake 
based on an error of reference such as this is not what we’re after. We are after 
shifts from apparent identities to true or real identities of actions, where our being 
misled into taking the action to be what it appeared to us to be (as opposed to 
what it really is) was not the result of a simple mistake, like that of Clouseau, but 
the result of a systematic distortion of our perception of what it is we and our 
fellow social actors are doing. 
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The sociologist and social theorist are not concerned with correcting the simple 
mistakes made by individuals. We might say, for example, Jurgen Habermas is not 
concerned with providing a theory which serves the purpose of telling Jane that 
she is in fact repairing John’s bicycle, not Richard’s, as she had mistakenly thought 
because both bikes are red, have a punctured rear tyre and are usually stored in 
the shed in the back garden. Sociologists and social theorists are in the business 
not of correcting simple errors of reference such as Jane’s or Clouseau’s, but are, 
rather, in the business of claiming there is a systematic refraction and then provid-
ing the conceptual tools for adjusting for or offsetting the (alleged) mistakes (mis-
takings), which stem from the refraction.  
Recall the analogy I drew at the outset with the well-known stick-in-water il-
lusion. It’s not the case that the stick looks bent because we have misunderstood 
how straight the stick in question should be for it to count for us as a straight 
stick. Nor is it a case of a mistake of reference: we do not mistakenly believe the 
stick to be bent because we’re looking at the wrong stick. Rather, the stick appears 
to us as bent, because of the refractive properties of water, in which it is sub-
merged. This is an example of systematic refraction and it is this that social scien-
tists and social theorists set out to expose. With this in mind, consider two further 
scenarios, that might help us gain some clarity: 
Malika asks Richard if there is any coffee on the table. Richard reports back that 
there is. Malika enters the room to fill her cup with coffee, only to find that Richard 
had misunderstood her question. In answering yes, he was referring to a pool of all-
but-dried spilt coffee on the table. There was, in fact, no jug of coffee—no potable, 
much less drinkable, coffee. A simple mistake, possibly owing to the indeterminacy 
in the proposition: there is coffee on the table when the context has failed to fix the 
referent. 
Let’s run through a superficially-similar scenario: 
Malika pages her PA Richard, and asks if there is any coffee on the table. Richard 
looks through to the table, from where he sits at his desk and answers ‘yes’. Malika 
then leaves her own desk and enters the room from a different door to the one 
Richard had looked through. Malika observes that there is no coffee on the table. 
Richard and Malika spend some time together trying to understand how it came to 
be that there appeared to Richard that there was coffee on the table, when they now 
both agree that there was in fact none. They rule out simple misunderstandings 
regarding that to which each of them had intended to refer when talking of ‘coffee 
on the table’ (they agree the criteria for ‘coffee’ and ‘table’) and they rule out coffee 
being there and then being moved, before Malika entered the room. Finally, they 
realise that from Richard’s perspective, sitting at his desk, there is a trick of the light, 
which makes it appear, on occasion, that there is a jug of coffee on the table. Anyone 
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sitting in Richard’s chair, unless they knew about the trick the light can play, would 
more than likely believe there to be a jug of coffee on the table, when in reality there 
is no coffee on the table. 
The second of these two Malika and Richard scenarios is closer to what we’re 
after with regards to the systematic distortions social scientists and social theorists 
take us to be subject to. However, while this example serves to bring to the fore 
the distinction between error based in misunderstanding and mistakes arising 
from systematic distortion, it is not an example of an action having been so dis-
torted. So, we need an example which is an instance of a shift from identifying an 
action with how it appears (the equivalent of identifying the submerged stick as a 
bent stick), to identifying the same action as it really is (the equivalent of acknowl-
edging that the appearance of the stick as bent is misleading owing the refractive 
properties of water and understanding that the stick is really straight). The exam-
ple must be one whereby the apparent identity of the action is systematically con-
ferred.  
The problem we face in our search for an apposite example is that the sort of 
examples we are looking for here depend upon us having accepted a theory of 
systematic sociological refraction in the first place; if you like, such examples 
clearly stated are so as functions of a theory which first establishes that there is a 
system of sociological refraction in place. We can, however, get some idea by con-
sidering an example that takes place over time. The once common belief in the 
existence of witches might be proposed as one such example. For, if we no longer 
believe in witchcraft then we no longer believe that action ‘X’ was an act of (or a 
token of the type of action we class as) spell-casting. Or, a better example might 
be, we no longer believe that action ‘Y’ is an example of an action which gains its 
identity through our seeing it as the action of a person under the influence of a 
spell, or, someone who has been bewitched. 
If we no longer take those we might refer to as witches to be those possessing 
the power of magic (for we no longer believe in magic), we no longer recognise 
their power (power in virtue of their status as a witch) over others, such that we 
do not take a person acting as if they’ve been bewitched to (truly) be so bewitched. 
We might instead take them to have been hypnotised, or be engaging in a dis-
claimed action. Now, had you been living in a culture (say northern Europe in the 
Middle Ages) where the belief in witches was natural, part of our second nature 
or our Bildung, we might say, then you too might have identified certain actions 
as actions of the bewitched (whether your own or those of your bewitched peers). 
Whatever the details, whatever the particular identity you gave to that action, 
identifying it within the basic framework of, or class of, bewitched actions, is 
something that you can see from the perspective of your—our—present culture as 
systematically mistaken. They (we) weren’t really bewitched. 
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The mistake here was not a simple mistake based on misunderstanding the 
meaning of someone’s utterance, in the manner that Clouseau’s was. The mistake 
here is one which is facilitated by sociological refraction, which led people to be-
lieve in the power of magic.  
Acts which were identified as one kind of act come to be reidentified as another. 
They change identity, from what they were apparently to what they are really. The 
change is not based on correcting a simple mistake of reference, but on wider 
changes in world view. Our social theorist and social scientist work with some-
thing like this model. The social theorist or social scientist wishes to provide us 
with a theory or methodology which shows us that our ordinary understandings 
of our actions are based on mere appearance and that their theory or methodology 
shows us this. 
However, it is instructive, crucial even, to note the similarities and the differ-
ences: our example is systematic, and in this regard similar to what the social the-
orist and social scientist are seeking to achieve; on the other hand, where in our 
example the revision in the identity of the actions was brought about through the 
initial conception of the actions not fitting with the wider, experienced and lived 
lifeworld as we our worldview changed over centuries, in the case of our social 
theorist and social scientist the revision in the identity of the action is brought 
about by the social theorist or social scientist claiming their theory or methodol-
ogy show us the real world. This difference is important. The first, as presented in 
the example, is about bringing the identity of our action in line with the way the 
lifeworld is now; the second, as argued for by our social theorist and social scien-
tist, is about bringing the identity of our action into line with their theory of the 
world or the world they claim their methodology discloses to us, in exposing the 
ideological distortions, the folk-theory, and so on.  
The thought is that in order to be able to both criticise and avoid reifying the 
status quo, we need to identify what the action really is. Identifying action as that 
which competent actors identify it as is like (to invoke a similar sentiment ex-
pressed in a different context by the philosopher of science Paul Griffiths (Griffiths 
1997)) calling whales fish because folk once thought them to be such. We need to 
go beyond such understanding. We need to go beyond mere appearances. 
This is the ‘two worlds’ theory of action. 
1. There is the world of apparent actions. These appear to exist only in 
virtue of a system of sociological refraction being in place that serves 
to systematically distort our (members of society’s) perceptions of our 
actions. This is the world in which folk live. This is also the world, so 
their detractors would have it, that Ethnomethodologists and Wittgen-
steinians, such as Peter Winch reify: transform from apparent to ‘real’ 
(fake-real). 
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and 
2. There is the world of real actions, which can be discerned by employing 
tools which neutralise the refractions, or get underneath the appear-
ances. This is the world promised by social scientists and social theo-
rists. Access to this world brings liberation from the tyranny of the 
world of the apparent. 
It is this ‘two worlds’ theory of action that is my concern. In what follows, I 
will examine four prominent accounts of systematic sociological refraction and 
their attendant accounts of action. 
SYSTEMS OF SOCIOLOGICAL REFRACTION 
AND IDENTIFYING ACTION 
So, how might we adjudicate as to what the true identity of the action is? Well let’s 
begin with what can seem a natural assumption, that every action involves some 
piece of physical behaviour. If we begin here, with this natural assumption, then 
we might be able to establish our account of action that will enable us to adjudi-
cate between apparent and real identities of actions. The problem is that this per-
fectly natural assumption, that all action involves some piece of physical behav-
iour, can and has led in two seemingly diametrically opposed directions: 
1. post-structuralist scepticism about the possibility of identifying action, and 
2. extensional rendering so as to ‘clearly’ identify the action. 
 I’ll say a little more about each of these in turn with reference to the notion of 
methods of sociological refraction I introduced above. 
1. The refractive properties of 
... the trace of logically possible alternative identities of any particular action 
Let us say that someone agrees that the questions ‘what are you doing?’ and ‘what 
do you take yourself to be doing?’ are not synonymous, but while doing so that 
person takes us to be subject to a system of sociological refraction that goes all 
the way down, as it were. They therefore agree that the two questions are distinct 
but reject the thought that this implies that there is such a thing as an action’s 
specific, true or real identity. Here our interlocutor might insist on a plurality of 
competing interpretations of an action. On this account, what an action is is taken 
to be a matter of interpretation, and we might even go so far as to insist that the 
idea of the identity of an action is always beyond reach, deferred, we might say. 
The idea is that all interpretations are renderings of some sort, and for some—
234     Phil Hutchinson 
possibly unconscious—reason. All our attempts to identify the action are interpre-
tations which are disrupted and distorted, and thus their meaning is deferred, by 
the trace of previous or possible future interpretations of similar actions, which 
involve the same bodily movement. 
So, for example, our (attempt at an) identification of an action as altruistic, will 
always be disrupted by the trace of previous occasions and possible future occa-
sions in which a similar piece of physical behaviour might have been interpreted 
as a self-interested action. Here the physical components of the action are assumed 
equivalent to written components of a word—marks on the page. The reading of 
the physical components is equivalent to the reading of the word. The meaning of 
the action, what it is on this particular occasion, is disrupted by the trace of pre-
vious or possible future events of interpreting actions in the way that the meaning 
of a word, what it is on this particular occasion, will always be deferred by the 
trace of previous and possible future events of language involving this word. 
The argument underpinning such a view is as follows: for marks to be meaning-
apt, to have the possibility of meaning something, they must be iterable. That is to 
say, marks must be reproducible on other occasions and in the absence of the 
author, intended recipient and similar context. So, a meaningful mark must—ac-
cording to the structural logic of writing—always be an iterable mark. Put another 
way, it is internal to the structural logic of meaningful marks that it is possible 
that there have been previous events of communication involving those same 
marks or that it is possible that there will be future occasions when those marks 
are employed in further communicative events. In case we’re still unclear, we can 
put it yet another way: for a mark on a page (or black/white board, computer 
screen, and so on) to have the possibility of meaning anything, of being used to 
communicate or express a thought, it must be (logically) possible for the same type 
of mark to be used in the future or to have been used in the past (hence, in a 
different context), in the absence of the current author of the mark and in the 
absence of the current intended recipient of the mark. Now, the upshot of this is 
that all events of communication involve iterable marks, and thus—for we are told 
this follows from the structural logic of iterability—the trace of those previous 
iterations of those same marks and the trace of the possible future iterations of 
those same marks disrupts and distorts any attempt to fix, once and for all, the 
meaning of the current event of communication that involves said mark. 
Now, take a piece of physical movement as an iterable mark, and the meaning 
of action is open to the same analysis as was the meaning of the written word. The 
identity of the action is deferred owing to the logic of iterability: the trace of pre-
vious or possible future events involving the same (iterable) movement disrupts 
any attempt at identifying the meaning of the current action. The true identity of 
an action is always just beyond reach. The structural logic of iterability defies any 
attempt to fix the meaning and thus the identity of the present action. 
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Here we have then a general scepticism about the identity of action, derived 
from—and on some accounts, intrinsic to—a post-structuralist deconstruction of 
traditional theories of meaning. How does this impact upon our discussion of the 
‘two worlds’ theory of action? Well here the system of sociological refraction is 
the structural logic of iterability. It is in the very fact that actions have meaning 
that their full meaning on an occasion is refracted. What is distinctive about this 
model of refraction is that it pretends to offer no insight into the world of real 
actions—one of the two worlds is always deferred. It merely contents itself with 
exposing refractions, by deconstructing them. All actions are interpretations and 
thus subject to the distorting power of the trace. 
2. The refractive properties of 
... intensional renderings of the physical properties of behaviour 
An interlocutor of an altogether different sort might similarly agree that there is a 
distinction between the questions ‘what are you doing?’ and ‘what do you take 
yourself to be doing?’ However, they do not move from such agreement to a gen-
eral scepticism about meaning, which in turn entails or involves a scepticism about 
the very idea of an action having a unique identity. Such philosophers might in-
stead allow their focus to dwell upon what our first group took to be the iterable 
component of the action—the physical movement of the body involved. In this 
way, our philosophers respond to our identification of the possibility of competing 
identities or meanings of actions, such as between what the bearer took his action 
to be and what an observer took the action to be by saying ‘a plague on both your 
houses’. Here the thought is that one can have many competing intensional de-
scriptions of an action but only one extensional description, which identifies the 
action purely in terms of the physical movement of bodies, through time and 
space. 
The idea is that intensional descriptions involve—and thus we might say are 
tainted by—people’s thoughts: judgements, beliefs, construals and so on about the 
action being described. Extensional descriptions, in contrast, are descriptions of 
the ‘action’ which are shorn of all but their physical components. Here the ‘two 
worlds’ theory is clearly brought out. The world of apparent actions is the world 
of intensional descriptions of actions. The world of real actions, what the actions 
really are, is accessed by extensionally describing actions: describing the actions 
purely in terms of physical movement through time and space. The system of re-
fraction is here thought to be people’s (folk) beliefs about actions—where those 
beliefs are stated in a manner which involves psychological predicates such as de-
sires, hopes and the like. 
A prominent exponent of such an approach, Hillel Steiner, puts the matter thus: 
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An act-token is fully identified, then, by an extensional description of the action in 
question: a description indicating the physical components of that action. There 
cannot be more than one act-token (of a particular act-type) answering to the same 
extensional description, i.e. having the same set of physical components. Purely in-
tensional descriptions of actions, by contrast, do cover more than one act-token. 
Such descriptions are couched in terms of the purpose or meaning attached by the 
actor (or others) to what he does: my attending Richard III, my running for a bus, 
my throwing a ball and so on. It’s true of each of these descriptions that there are 
many events that would answer to it. (Steiner 1994: 36) 
Here, action and movement are collapsed together, and this is the (specific) ac-
tion ‘fully identified’. There seems a certain irony—not to mention equivocation 
on the word ‘action’—in writing, as does Steiner, that the action fully identified is 
a description of the physical components of the action in question. But maybe this 
is a little unfair on Steiner. His context is strictly one of disputes about distributive 
justice, and specifically when it is right to say of one person that they are unfree 
to ϕ (where ϕ is an act-token involving a particular spatial location at a particular 
time and perhaps also involving some particular object). 
In a similar manner to our discussion of the post-structuralist approach, above, 
we can illustrate Steiner’s approach by reference to the more standard context for 
such ways of talking, found in the philosophy of language: in this case, natural 
kind semantics. 
Here a natural kind term is split into four components: Syntactic marker, se-
mantic marker, stereotype and extension. It is the latter two components that are 
of interest to us, and to Steiner. The stereotype of a natural kind term corresponds 
to what competent speakers of the language believe about the kind. The extension 
of the term corresponds to what the best current science tells us about the kind. 
An example of these classifications for the term ‘whale’ might be as follows: syn-
tactic marker: ‘noun’; semantic marker: ‘mammal’; stereotype: (something like) 
‘large, migratory, sea-faring mammal’; extension: what the best current science 
tells us a whale ‘really is’, which would most likely involve its genetic code and its 
biological classification in the evolutionary tree (genera, phylum, species). 
How does this translate into identification of action? Well, the focus here is on 
intension and extension. An action might be intensionally understood to be a num-
ber of things: we might take (or believe, judge, construe) my ‘punching’ Reuben 
(my clenched fist striking Reuben’s face at speed) 
1. as a ‘cry for help’, 
2. as an ‘act of aggression’, 
3. as an ‘attempt to teach Reuben a valuable lesson in life’, 
4. as an ‘attempt to teach Reuben how and why to defend against an up-
percut’, 
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5. as an ‘attempt to demonstrate to Reuben today that his endorsement 
yesterday of Anthony Kenny’s (1989) claim that “‘the self’” is a piece of 
philosopher’s nonsense consisting in a misunderstanding of the reflexive 
pronoun”,2 doesn’t hold-true in any practical sense, or at least in any 
sense Reuben now wishes to defend’, or 
6. as a ‘a rather badly performed and rather rash act of field cranial oste-
opathy’. 
All of these qualify as potentially valid—though varying somewhat on the plau-
sibility scale—intensional descriptions of something I did, involving me, Reuben, 
my fist and his face. It might be so intensionally understood, because these are the 
things we can justifiably believe this piece of behaviour to be (or construe this 
piece of behaviour as; or judge this piece of behaviour to be). On Steiner’s account, 
we overcome the problem of competing intensional descriptions of an action by 
appealing to the extensional description. Here, the description is generated from 
that which the current best empirical science tells us about the movement observed 
(and only that). My punching of Reuben is rendered as descriptions of the move-
ments of the physical components through space and time. Steiner (1994: 36, n.42) 
writes: 
Complete extensional descriptions of actions (i.e. act-tokens) don’t generally figure 
in ordinary conversation, due to the normal superfluity and tedium of their detailed 
specificity. They have, however, long been employed in certain fields of activity—
notably athletics, industrial work processes and, latterly, certain areas of medicine—
where fine-grained analyses of actions (often assisted by decelerated films and com-
puterised charting of the movements involved) can facilitate improved performance; 
cf. Marey, Movement, and Shaw, The Purpose and Practice of Motion Study, esp. 
chs. 4–7. Modern motion study techniques were pioneered by Frank and Lillian 
Gilbreth, nicely portrayed in the 1950 Hollywood film ‘Cheaper by the Dozen’. On 
the underlying biomechanical analysis and metrication, see Fung, Biomechanics, ch. 
1, and Pennycuick, Newton Rules Biology. 
One might be tempted to respond, as am I, that they ‘don’t generally figure in 
ordinary conversation’ not because of the ‘normal superfluity and tedium of their 
detailed specificity’ (though one would not be so rash as to rule that out as a 
significant factor, on occasion) but because they don’t capture the action: they 
don’t identify it. If we are able to specify the movement that an action involves, 
we do so because we have begun with the action itself. We don’t begin with the 
movement and then layer-on the intension, as it were, building up to what Steiner 
 
2 Cf. P. F. Strawson’s (2002) criticism of Kenny. 
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calls the intensional description of an action. Therefore, to say that this movement 
‘is the action fully identified’ is problematic, to say the least. 
Consider the action I am calling ‘my punching of Reuben’. Now, there is a sense 
in which this can be described as ‘my hand, formed in a clenched fist, moving 
rapidly in the direction of and terminating at Reuben’s chin’. However, it might 
also be described as ‘my hand, formed in a clenched fist, moving rapidly in the 
direction of Beijing, and terminating at Manchester Oxford Road station (North 
West, UK).’ If Reuben happens to be standing in the appropriate place (somewhere 
that can legitimately be referred to as Manchester Oxford Road Station, and on a 
straight line that can be drawn from me to Beijing and passing through him), then 
both descriptions, while we might see them to be qualifying as extensional, might 
be considered equally valid. 
Steiner will respond that there is a more fundamental description. This is the 
truly extensional description, as discussed in the quotation above. But here one is 
inclined to think that one enters an infinite regress. Because surely it is legitimate 
to ask at what stage are we happy to say that we are dealing in—have reached the 
level of—a purely extensional description? For even at the level of purely biome-
chanical descriptions, considerations of agency and purpose play a role. And we 
might ask, why stop at biomechanical description? What about description at the 
atomic level, for example? However, here is the real kicker, as it were: If we can 
arrive at a description which satisfies us as being liberated of all intension, it then 
seems to be a description that has been abstracted from that which ties it to the 
very thing we are hoping (in Steiner’s case at least) to adjudicate on (distributive 
justice). For anything that might be truly counted as a purely extensional descrip-
tion is not a description of what someone (some person) is doing but a description 
of the movement of some piece of matter. Those two things might be coextensive, 
but describing the former in terms of the latter is to radically under determine the 
former (the doings (actions) of people). 
Movement as the essence of action  
Both post-structuralist scepticism about identity of action and extensional render-
ing share the underlying assumption that physical movement is an essential com-
ponent of action. While in the latter case the essence is distilled out of what we 
normally take the action to be—the action intensionally described—in an attempt 
to fully specify the action, in the former case this component is treated with sus-
picion, being said to disrupt attempts to fix the identity of any particular action. 
Despite, therefore, moving in opposite directions, both these approaches to the 
identity of action begin with the same assumption, and this might be shown to be 
less straightforward than one is inclined to think. 
In his paper ‘Where the Action is’, Frank Ebersole (2001) works through eleven 
candidates for the particular sort of movement that might be assumed to be the 
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essence of action. I shan’t reproduce in full Ebersole’s taxonomy of examples here 
(please look up Ebersole’s paper), I’ll merely comment that the eleven candidates 
might be said to fall in to one of three classes: 
1. Those pieces of behaviour that we refer to as movement which, on further 
reflection, we see are actions that we, for one reason or another, might on 
occasion see fit to refer to as movements (cf. Ebersole’s example of the 
country girl who arriving in the city and answering a job advertisement for 
a dancer, is asked to watch a demonstration of the sort of dance she will be 
expected to perform. When she sees the dance, she responds: ‘I simply can-
not perform those bodily movements!’). 
2. Involuntary movements, such as tics, twitches, externally forced move-
ments, and so on. While these are more clearly movement (rather than ac-
tions described as movement (as in the previous class 1) they are not the 
sort of movement we have in mind when we think of that which is essential 
to actions. For, if at source my ‘punching’ of Reuben is a tic or twitch or 
Reuben forcing my fist on to his face at speed and against my will, it dis-
qualifies it from being an action of the sort represented in the various in-
tensional descriptions above (indeed, in the case of Reuben forcing my fist, 
it disqualifies it from being correctly described as a punch). 
3. The movements of a creature’s appendage, where we are simply unclear as 
to whether it is correct, in the case of this creature (or ‘thing’), to call that 
movement action. For example, robots, coral, alien lifeforms in science fic-
tion (e.g. the black sludge creature that kills Lieutenant Tasha Yar in season 
one of Star Trek: The Next Generation) or animated though dismembered 
limbs in horror stories and so on. Here we might hesitate to talk of action 
and instead talk of the creature’s appendage moving. 
None of these three classes of those things we call movements seem to be what 
we’re after when we think of the movement essential to an action. We seem to 
have something approaching a paradox: either the movement is really an action 
(class 1), in which case we cannot say that it is essential to the action. Or, the 
movement is not the sort of thing to which we intend to appeal to when we talk 
of the movement essential to action (classes 2 and 3). We might note here, that it 
was something similar to this paradox that Steiner faced: either his extensional 
description was still contaminated by intension and thus was not what he claimed 
of it; or, it became so far removed from action as to radically underdetermine that 
action, and thus could not plausibly be referred to as ‘the action (act-token) fully 
identified’. 
We might deepen the criticism offered by Ebersole by way of drawing certain 
parallels between it and Wittgenstein’s critical reflections on the commonplace 
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appeal to mental processes in attempts to explain thinking and understanding 
(found in his Philosophical Investigations (1953); also see Hutchinson, (2010)). 
Briefly stated: The issue is not that Ebersole rejects physical movement’s role in 
action tout court. This would surely be implausible. Rather, Ebersole wants to 
facilitate our realisation that when we talk of ‘movements’ as essential to action 
we are less than clear about what it is we’re talking about. And gaining clarity is 
helpful. For, if we take our employment of the term ‘movement’ in the claim that 
‘movement is the essence of action’ to be continuous with our employment of the 
term in other domains (the three classes listed above) we still have some work to 
do, for it seems we are faced with a paradox. 
We might put the point as follows: in communicating with our interlocutor 
who is committed to the idea that movement is the essence of action, we might 
say to her that talking of movement as essential or necessary to all action is fine, 
so long as you either: 
1. acknowledge that you are employing the word ‘movement’ in a new 
way, a way which does not necessarily imply continuity with or draw 
upon your employment of that word in other domains; or 
2. you furnish us with a justification for and defence of your claim (contra 
Ebersole’s observations) that the notion of ‘movement’ you invoke in 
the phrase ‘movement is the essence of action’ is continuous with pre-
vious employments of the word movement in other domains (such as 
the three classes listed above). 
What we should want to do in engaging in this way with our action theorist is 
bring to consciousness her hitherto unacknowledged assumption that the notion 
of movement to which she appeals is akin to, or is modelled on the sorts of move-
ment we talk about in other contexts and about which we already have under-
standing. Of course, the upshot of this strategy is that while we have not denied 
our interlocutor her recourse to the invocation of movement as the essence of ac-
tion—for we have not policed her language use—we have problematised the move 
she makes. For in making her aware that her use of the term ‘movement’ still leaves 
many questions unanswered, because it departs from previous uses of that term, 
we are inviting her to provide us with the rules according to which she now em-
ploys the term—we are asking her to commit to a grammar for her use of the term 
‘movement’ when she talks of movement being the essence of action. 
What Ebersole shows is that the appeal to movement by those who wish to 
assume movement to be the essence of action is an appeal to something which is 
not continuous with standard uses of the term ‘movement’. The ‘movement’ in-
voked as the trace, therefore, and the ‘movement’ said to be extensionally de-
scribed need more in the way of exposition. However, when we engage in such 
exposition we will likely find that what we hope to appeal to as the movement-as-
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essence-of-action is rather better thought of as an artefact of our way of approach-
ing the subject. That the physical aspects of an action are not separable, are not 
discrete components of action which are most clearly represented as ‘movement-
as-essence-of-action’, much less extensionally described. 
This then suggests that it is not altogether clear how (what we can now put in 
scare quotes) ‘movement’ can leave a trace or can be said to be the action fully 
identified. For, the sort of movement we are talking of when we talk of ‘movement-
as-the-essence-of-action’ is something which is parasitic on the action, it is inferred 
from the action (intensionally described). When we commence describing any 
piece of movement that we take to be the essence of an action, we do so having 
first observed and identified the action. 
Ideology critique and sociobiology 
If we accept a critique of the two approaches so far discussed, based on the un-
derlying picture they assume holds true, we are still left with approaches which 
subscribe to the two-worlds view and warrant consideration. Two prominent ex-
amples of which are what we might call the ideology critique approach (rooted in 
Marxist and Marxian social theory) and the biological reductionist approach (as 
found in Sociobiology and Evolutionary Psychology). 
3. Refractive properties of 
… ideology  
Ideology critique suggests that actors are systematically misled as to what they are 
doing by the dominant ideology (system of ideas that frame—form the horizons 
of—and structure—determine what is rational—thought) of the culture/society 
within which they live. Here, while my act might be taken by me and my fellow 
citizens to have one identity, it is only the apparent identity. For, when we are 
availed of the methodological tools we see the action for what it really is. 
In a similar manner, the reductionist approach claims that actors might be sys-
tematically misled as to what they are doing because they make sense of their 
actions by invoking folk theories, and these folk theories of their behaviour are to 
be dispensed with once we understand our true nature as organisms. Thus, I am 
systematically misled by folk theories of action which identify actions according 
to what members of a society think about them. For example, I take myself to be 
acting altruistically but I’m really merely a vessel for gene replication and acting 
in this way is really nothing other than an invoking of the kinship principle (cf. 
E.O. Wilson) which explains how apparently altruistic behaviour is really a man-
ifestation of genetically endowed selfish behaviour at the genetic level (cf. Richard 
Dawkins). 
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Despite points of contact with the approaches that we’ve already discussed, 
these latter two approaches spring from neither a scepticism about the meaning-
fulness of any action, which stems from the trace left by—conferred by—that ac-
tion’s iterable physical components; nor from attempting to identify the action 
extensionally, which stems from a desire to transcend competing conceptions of 
the action’s identity. What I am here calling the ‘ideology critique’ approach and 
the ‘sociobiology’ approach are not best understood as being held in thrall by a 
picture of action as having an undefined but necessary physical component, or as 
being essentially physical behaviour. (It should be noted that talking of a thing’s 
essence is not merely to talk of an always-present or even an extensionally-neces-
sary component, but to accord explanatory significance to that component. ‘Ex-
planatory significance’ is irreducibly normative.) Rather, what seems to be distinc-
tive about these two approaches is that they approach the question of an action’s 
identity as if it were a question for which one needed a particular theoretical 
framework or methodology to answer it correctly. The thought (one we should be 
familiar with by now) is that in the absence of such a framework, we merely an-
swer in accordance with the dominant ideology or we answer in accordance with 
the prevalent folk theory.  
Here the social scientist’s methodology and the social theorist’s theory are as-
sumed to work in a manner similar to the telescope in the hands of the astronomer 
and the electron microscope in the hands of the particle physicist: they enable the 
investigator to see something that otherwise cannot be seen. In the case of the 
social theorist, their theory, and in the case of the social scientist, their methodol-
ogy, are claimed to enable one to see the—real—action. 
It is not right to say of our ideology critic or reductionist social theorist, there-
fore, that they are constrained by the same underlying picture as were our post-
structuralist and our extensionalist. They are not constrained by the thought that 
action is essentially physical movement. Instead, our social scientist and social the-
orist are concerned to discern the real meaning of the action, its identity, through 
the employment of specially designed tools. While in the case of the astronomer 
and the particle physicist the tools are material artefacts, designed and constructed 
for specific practical purposes,3 in the case of our social scientist and social theorist 
they are, we might say, conceptual tools designed for a sociological purpose: tools 
which enable us to see the logic of human societies. 
So, we can draw a distinction between the tools employed by social scientists 
and social theorists on the one hand and those employed by astronomers and par-
ticle physicists, on the other—the former being conceptual for logic-discerning 
purposes and the latter being material artefacts for practical purposes. The 
 
3 There is an interesting body of literature on how such artefacts come to be accepted as doing the 
job the investigators that first used them claimed for them. See Paul Feyerabend’s (2010) Against 
Method  for discussion of the emergence of the telescope from this perspective. 
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distinction between conceptual ‘tools’ and material artefacts is easily grasped. 
What about the distinction between logic-discerning purpose and practically ori-
ented purpose? Well, what I mean by this might be thought to be the following: 
the telescope and the microscope enable their users to do something—to see some-
thing that unaided they cannot see, for the human eye is not capable of seeing 
things that are so small and/or far away. In this sense the telescope and the electron 
microscope have a genuine practical role: in a sense they extend the visual capa-
bilities of the investigator. 
What of the conceptual tools? The ‘seeing’ afforded to the social theorist by the 
conceptual tools can only be said to extend the capacities of the theorist in so 
much as one already accepts the truth of the theorist’s claim. Now, while there is 
something right about this way of drawing the distinction, it will be objected that 
this assumes too strong a distinction between the two domains of inquiry. For in 
the former (astronomy and particle physics) if we cannot see unaided that which 
our tools, once introduced, enable us to see, then accepting that which those tools 
enable us to see as visual objects is not as straightforward as we might have been 
tempted to assume. Again, it seems that even in these two areas of the natural 
sciences, accepting the tools as extending the natural capabilities of the investiga-
tor means having already accepted the results gained through employment of those 
tools as results of those same (artefactually-)extended (visual) capabilities.  
What is it that I am appealing to, therefore, when invoking practical purposes 
in contrast to logic-discerning purposes? It is the following: we can put those re-
sults to practical use; we can map the surface of and plot a course to the Moon 
and to Mars (initially seen through the telescope); once there, we see that our maps 
are accurate. We can observe the activity of sub-atomic particles (electrons) and 
having done so, we can harness that activity in the construction of microproces-
sors. The examples are legion. 
Are there similar practical purposes to which we can put the ‘results’ discerned 
through the employment of our social scientist’s and social theorist’s conceptual 
tools—their methodology or theory? Again, I suggest, not without having already 
accepted their putative results as results. 
We seem, in the case of our social scientists and social theorists, to be caught 
in a vicious circle. For, while in the case of our two examples from natural science, 
we can see how the circle is broken by activities: travel to the moon, checking the 
surface viewed from orbit and viewed from the surface against that seen through 
telescopes. In the case of social science there seems no comparable way of breaking 
the circle: no amount of observation from whatever vantage point will enable one 
to confirm or reject the claim that action X is an altruistic act. 
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4. Refractive properties of 
… folk theory of mind and society—the case of sociobiology, 
evolutionary psychology and homeostatic mechanisms 
To further illustrate, consider the following example. Homeostatic mechanisms 
are familiar to many working in the sciences, particularly the biological sciences. 
They serve explanatory roles that are uncontroversial and philosophically unprob-
lematic. Their structure is as follows: X and Y are connected, such that when Z 
fluctuates outside certain parameters, X receives this information via a receptor, 
determines the action required and communicates this to the effector Y. Y acts to 
re-establish equilibrium (as instructed by X) by bringing Z back within the set 
parameters of the system. Thus, once we have observed the mechanism and estab-
lished the laws by which it operates, we need only observe either X or Y or Z in 
future, and from those (partial observations) we can simply deduce the behaviour 
of the other elements of the homeostatic mechanism according to the homeostatic 
laws by which such mechanisms operate. What, for example, Y is doing at any 
point, can be deduced from our observation of the behaviour of X or of Z and 
our application of the laws of the mechanism. 
In the context of the social sciences what tends to happen is something akin to 
the following: we theoretically postulate a homeostatic mechanism and thus the-
oretically postulate the laws by which it ‘operates’. When we observe X we deduce 
according to the theoretically postulated laws of the theoretically postulated 
mechanism the behaviour of the theoretically postulated ‘Y’ (which is theoretically 
homeostatically related to X). We then explain the behaviour of X in terms of the 
theoretically postulated behaviour of (theoretically postulated) Y. Theoretically-
postulated-Y and the theoretically-postulated-laws by which it operates now serve 
as mechanisms for the identification of the action of X. 
What is different in the two cases is that in the latter case the identity of the 
actions of X rest on nothing but the theoretical framework which the theorist 
constructed around X. In the former case, a case of a homeostatic mechanism in 
the context of the biological sciences, the identity of the actions of X arise from 
the laws derived from observing the existence of a (not theoretically postulated) 
homeostatic mechanism and the laws by which it operates: when the insulin levels 
drop below level ‘c’, X φs. 
To illustrate more concretely: in healthy mammals, blood glucose levels are 
regulated. This is done by there being in place a homeostatic mechanism. When 
blood glucose levels move outside set parameters, a receptor sends this infor-
mation to the control centre (brain), which in turn determines the level of response 
and communicates this to the effector (pancreas), which if functioning correctly 
resets the equilibrium through the release of the hormones insulin and/or gluca-
gon. So, the blood glucose levels = Z, in our initial discussion of homeostatic mech-
anisms. The pancreas = Y and the brain = X. Biologists have observed this 
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mechanism in full and at work. When it breaks down, as in those who have dia-
betes, it needs replacing—which at present is done by the diabetic monitoring their 
own blood glucose levels externally, and administering insulin when necessary to 
re-establish or maintain equilibrium: in short, the mechanism is externalised 
through the person’s employment of litmus paper and charts to monitor their 
blood-glucose levels (X) and insulin administered by hand with the aid of a syringe 
(Y) to stabilise these levels within the safe parameters (Z). 
In the context of social science, individuals take the role of X in the homeostatic 
mechanism, and while they and their behaviour is observable, crucially the identity 
of their actions are thought to be in question. The social scientist or social theorist 
thus theorises a mechanism which theoretically confers meaning on to the behav-
iour—it identifies the action (or establishes what the action is not). So, for the 
sociobiologist, the other side of the theoretically postulated mechanism (Y) is said 
to be the selfish gene. Theoretically postulating the person as merely one part of a 
theoretically postulated homeostatic mechanism (X) which includes selfish genes 
(Y), serves to characterise the person as a vessel for gene replication. This then 
serves to provide a functional explanation of the person’s actions, given certain 
social conditions (Z). When Z is threatening to the abilities of the genes to repli-
cate, then the genes (Y) instruct the person (X) such that the person adjusts their 
behaviour so that maximum replicative possibilities are maximised. What the per-
son is doing—the identity of their action—at time t–1 can be read off the behav-
iour of the person viewed through the sociobiological theory. For the theory ex-
plains what a person is doing by theoretically postulating a homeostatic mecha-
nism of which the person is but the observable part. And, what we observe it as is 
dependent on the theoretically postulated mechanism. 
So, here we can see how the sociobiologist’s theory is supposed to work in a 
manner akin to the artefacts employed in the natural sciences, and as we discussed 
above. Of course, if one puts the stress on the biology part of the term sociobiol-
ogy, then the account just outlined might seem to make perfect sense. But surely 
this is to be misled by nothing more than a name: a little like thinking that because 
one calls something a science it must be scientific (think: creation science), or be-
cause a policy of an evidence-based approach to public health is announced we 
should simply accept, without further scrutiny, that evidence is the basis of the 
policy. 
The point is that for such explanations to get off the ground they must have a 
basis in more than mere naming ceremonies (whatever form those ceremonies 
might take: large books containing sophisticated arguments can be but one version 
of such). To talk more specifically about the sociobiologist’s explanation, the point 
is that those explanations are akin to ‘just-so’ stories. The sociobiologist’s expla-
nation of action, in terms of selfish genes regulating their vessels for replication 
(persons) so as to maximise replicative possibilities given environmental condi-
tions can only be shown true or false by observance of the behaviour of the vessel 
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(the person), but it is the identity of this that is in question and in need of expla-
nation and thus this cannot also serve as evidence. The same thing—‘X’—cannot 
serve as both evidence for the truth of the putative explanation of X while also 
being that which is in need of explanation. 
More concretely: Let us reflect on a scene from Terrence Malick’s film The Thin 
Red Line. The scene takes place in the US trenches at Guadalcanal, where a US 
soldier, Sgt. Keck, played by Woody Harrelson, reaches to pull a grenade from his 
webbing belt; in a fateful error, he fails to pull the grenade from his belt and in-
stead pulls the pin from the grenade. Sgt. Keck now has a live and soon-to-explode 
grenade attached to him. Now, he might have time to remove the live grenade and 
cast it away from him, such that it reduces the likelihood of serious harm or death 
to him. However, doing so would put his fellow soldiers at greater risk. He decides 
to fall against the side of the trench so that much of the explosive power of the 
grenade is absorbed by his body and the trench wall, thus minimising the damage 
to his fellow soldiers and to the trench but maximising his chances of death.  
While it is interesting to discuss the identity of Sgt. Keck’s action (and similar 
actions found in history) what I’m interested in here is how sociobiology or evo-
lutionary psychology explains his action. Here we would find something akin to 
the homeostatic mechanism, discussed above, being invoked. Sgt. Keck’s action, 
while most-likely appearing to many (ordinary folk or the folk theorist) as an 
altruistic act, would be explained as congruent with the explanatory schema of-
fered by the sociobiologist through invocation of the kinship principle. Here, high-
risk actions such as joining the army and going to war or a suicidal action (like 
that of Sgt. Keck) of one individual can be explained as promoting the greater 
replicative possibilities at the level of the genes, because the action serves to pro-
mote a better environment for the kin and their genes to replicate. Now, this ex-
planation might well be plausible. It might well make perfect sense. Equally, it 
might not. However, the problem with it as an explanation is that it does no more 
than offer a rationale for a particular way of interpreting the action of Sgt. Keck, 
and there are other rationales for proffering other interpretations. 
To approach this from a different perspective, consider again the brief summary 
of the homeostatic mechanism involved in the regulation of blood-glucose. Here, 
when we say of the pancreas that it releases more or less insulin we do so because 
we can measure it doing so. When we say the pancreas releases insulin into the 
blood to restore the blood’s glucose levels it is because we can observe and meas-
ure the drop in blood-glucose levels, and the rise of the same, subsequent to the 
release of the insulin. In short, our explanation of the pancreas’s role in the home-
ostatic mechanism can be arrived at inductively: through observation of the be-
haviour of the pancreas with regards to its release of insulin in to the blood stream, 
relative to blood-glucose levels. We can predict what the pancreas will do given 
the relevant conditions (i.e. blood-glucose levels) on the basis of our past 
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observations of functioning homeostatic systems of blood-glucose regulation in 
members of the same species. 
The case of Sgt. Keck is not analogous. It is tempting to think that the reason 
for the dis-analogy is that however many times we (have the misfortune to) ob-
serve people in Sgt. Keck’s unenviable situation we are never sure how someone 
finding themselves in a position like the one Keck finds himself in will act. But this 
is not what I want to get at here. The dis-analogy I want to draw attention to is 
the following: when we observe Sgt. Keck we do not simply observe the physical 
movement of matter through space and time, we observe a person taking the de-
cision to throw themselves on to an exploding grenade, and to do so in the 
knowledge that this is the course of action most likely to result in their own death. 
In the case of the pancreas we want to know why it releases insulin under certain 
conditions. In the case of Sgt. Keck we want to know why he throws himself on 
his soon-to-explode grenade: what the identity of his action is. In the case of the 
pancreas we observe its behaviour under certain conditions and arrive at an ex-
planation of that behaviour.  
Put another way, the dis-analogy is founded in the difference between the ex-
planandum in each case: i.e. the dis-analogy between the phenomena in need of 
explanation in each case. If we want to know whether an action is correctly char-
acterised as selfish or altruistic, answering that question by saying all actions are 
selfish because people are merely vessels for the replication of selfish genes, how-
ever these actions might superficially appear to us (because of a system of socio-
logical refraction), is to engage in ‘just-so’ story-telling. This would be akin to ex-
plaining the behaviour of the pancreas by reference only to a theory about what 
pancreases always do and (crucially) without having, or appealing to, evidence for 
them always doing this. For in the case of the identity of action, the question as to 
what (and we can stay with Sgt. Keck here) Sgt. Keck is doing is not an empirical 
question.  
We are led astray, if we are so, into thinking that the explananda in both cases 
are the same in relevant ways, because both can be stated as ‘why’ questions: ‘why 
does the pancreas release that amount of insulin at that time?’ and ‘why does Sgt. 
Keck throw himself on his soon-to-explode grenade?’ However, the former is a 
straightforwardly empirical question, which can be answered by identification of 
the causal laws, established through empirical investigation. The latter is what we 
might call a conceptual question; it is a question about the meaning of Sgt. Keck’s 
action.  
For the sociobiologist, while folk might believe that Sgt. Keck’s action is altru-
istic, it isn’t really because human beings only appear to act altruistically, when 
really they are merely vessels for the replication of selfish genes. The sociobiologist 
has, I submit, mistaken the sort of question being asked and offered a general 
causal explanation, which simply fails as explanans: it fails as an answer to the 
question (aside from the problems one might identify with the explanation in its 
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own terms, as I have noted above). The sociobiologist is a more sophisticated ver-
sion of the man who mistakenly assumes it is enough to point out medium-sized 
white goods in response to the global sceptic, as a way of demonstrating that there 
is a world outside the sceptic’s mind. Only, in the absence of empirical data to 
point at, the sociobiologist constructs a theory which they assume underpins and 
explains all behaviour in general terms. For when they fail to find a mechanism 
that will serve the role played by the biological homeostatic mechanism, our soci-
obiologist succumbs to the temptation to posit a theoretically-postulated quasi-
hypothetical ‘mechanism’. 
 
Homeostatic 
mechanism 
Regulation of 
blood glucose 
Regulation of 
blood glucose for 
a type 1 diabetic 
person 
Regulation of 
gene-replicative 
behaviour in social 
environment 
 
Sociobiological 
explanation of Sgt. 
Keck 
Control Centre: X Brain Person employing 
charts and litmus 
paper 
Selfish Genes 
(Genes acting 
according to a 
maximisation 
principle) 
Selfish Genes 
(Genes acting 
according to a 
maximisation 
principle and 
invoking the 
kinship principle) 
 
Effector: Y Pancreas Person 
exogenously 
administering 
synthetic insulin 
with a 
syringe/EpiPen  
Person (vessel for 
gene replication) 
Sgt. Keck (one 
organism among a 
kinship group of a 
number of 
organisms which 
operate as vessels 
for gene 
replication) 
 
Homeostatic 
environment: Z 
Blood (-glucose 
levels) 
Blood (-glucose 
levels) 
Social 
environment 
Specific social 
setting, within 
wider social 
environment. 
 
Table 1: Homeostatic mechanisms 
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THE CRAVING FOR GENERALITY 
The two worlds view of action, where there is the world of appearance and the 
world of real action, rests on a view of action where there must be something 
general to be said, some general explanatory component or tool. The social theo-
rist and social scientist set out to provide us with a general account of our subjec-
tion to sociological refraction and a method to see through the refracted appear-
ances of actions, to the true identity of actions. Why assume such? Why assume 
that there are systems of sociological refraction in place? Why not assume, until 
there is evidence to believe otherwise, that mistakes about the identity of any par-
ticular action might be taken alone as simple, or local, mistakes. We might then 
rather see the identity of action as being context and occasion sensitive: If we 
accept such a suggestion then our search for general explanatory components of 
action or general explanatory tools serves only to lead us to abstract from that 
which actually confers the action’s identity—its purpose and social setting. 
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